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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.45

Fairness in the k-Server Problem

Authors: Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, Shahin Kamali, Helia Karisani, and Cameron Musco

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

We initiate a formal study of fairness for the k-server problem, where the objective is not only to minimize the total movement cost, but also to distribute the cost equitably among servers. We first define a general notion of (α,β)-fairness, where, for parameters α ≥ 1 and β ≥ 0, no server incurs more than an α/k-fraction of the total cost plus an additive term β. We then show that fairness can be achieved without a loss in competitiveness in both the offline and online settings. In the offline setting, we give a deterministic algorithm that, for any ε > 0, transforms any optimal solution into an (α,β)-fair solution for α = 1 + ε and β = O(diam ⋅ log k / ε), while increasing the cost of the solution by just an additive O(diam ⋅ k log k / ε) term. Here diam is the diameter of the underlying metric space. We give a similar result in the online setting, showing that any competitive algorithm can be transformed into a randomized online algorithm that is fair with high probability against an oblivious adversary and still competitive up to a small loss. The above results leave open a significant question: can fairness be achieved in the online setting, either with a deterministic algorithm or a randomized algorithm, against a fully adaptive adversary? We make progress towards answering this question, showing that the classic deterministic Double Coverage Algorithm (DCA) is fair on line metrics and on tree metrics when k = 2. However, we also show a negative result: DCA fails to be fair for any non-vacuous parameters on general tree metrics. We further show that on uniform metrics (i.e., the paging problem), the deterministic First-In First-Out (FIFO) algorithm is fair. We show that any "marking algorithm", including the Least Recently Used (LRU) algorithm, also satisfies a weaker, but still meaningful notion of fairness.

Cite as

Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, Shahin Kamali, Helia Karisani, and Cameron Musco. Fairness in the k-Server Problem. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 45:1-45:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{daneshvaramoli_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.45,
  author =	{Daneshvaramoli, Mohammadreza and Hajiesmaili, Mohammad and Kamali, Shahin and Karisani, Helia and Musco, Cameron},
  title =	{{Fairness in the k-Server Problem}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{45:1--45:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.45},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253328},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.45},
  annote =	{Keywords: k-server problem, online algorithms, fairness, competitive analysis}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75

Prior-Independent and Subgame Optimal Online Algorithms

Authors: Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, and Anant Shah

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

This paper develops two game-theoretic notions of beyond worst-case analysis that give better than worst-case guarantees on natural inputs. We illustrate them through the finite-horizon ski-rental problem. First, we consider prior-independent design and analysis of online algorithms where, rather than choosing a worst-case input, the adversary chooses a worst-case independent and identical distribution over inputs. Prior-independent online algorithms are generally analytically intractable; instead we give a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme to compute them. Second, we consider the worst-case design of algorithms. We define "subgame optimality" which is stronger than worst-case optimality in that it requires the algorithm to take advantage of an adversary not playing a worst-case input. Algorithms that focus only on the worst case can be far from subgame optimal. Highlighting the potential improvement from these paradigms for the finite-horizon ski-rental problem, we empirically compare worst-case, subgame optimal, and prior-independent algorithms in the prior-independent framework. Finally, we analyze the structure of their decisions across input sequences: the prior-independent algorithm exhibits more extreme adaptations to observed data, in contrast with the more conservative behavior of worst-case and subgame optimal algorithms.

Cite as

Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, and Anant Shah. Prior-Independent and Subgame Optimal Online Algorithms. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 75:1-75:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{hartline_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75,
  author =	{Hartline, Jason and Johnsen, Aleck and Shah, Anant},
  title =	{{Prior-Independent and Subgame Optimal Online Algorithms}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{75:1--75:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75},
  annote =	{Keywords: online algorithms, prior-independent algorithm design, zero-sum games}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58

One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts

Authors: Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal’s utility), reward, and welfare. Our first result is a strong impossibility: For submodular reward functions, no randomized poly-time algorithm can approximate the optimal budget-feasible value within any finite factor, even with demand-oracle access. This result rules out extending known constant-factor guarantees from either (i) unbudgeted settings with combinatorial actions or (ii) budgeted settings with binary actions, to their combination. The hardness is tight: It holds even when all but one agent have binary actions and the remaining agent has just one additional action. On the positive side, we show that gross substitutes rewards (a well-studied strict subclass of submodular functions) admit a deterministic poly-time O(1)-approximation, using only value queries. Our results thus draw the first sharp separation between budgeted and unbudgeted settings in combinatorial contracts, and identifies gross substitutes as a tractable frontier for budgeted combinatorial contracts. Finally, we present an FPTAS for additive rewards, demonstrating that arbitrary approximation is tractable under any budget. This constitutes the first FPTAS for the multi-agent combinatorial-actions setting, even in the absence of budget constraints.

Cite as

Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger. One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 58:1-58:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58,
  author =	{Feldman, Michal and Gal-Tzur, Yoav and Ponitka, Tomasz and Schlesinger, Maya},
  title =	{{One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253459},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Combinatorial Contracts, Algorithmic Contract Design, Budget-Feasible Contracts}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13

Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs

Authors: Amey Bhangale, Arghya Chakraborty, and Prahladh Harsha

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract

Online bipartite matching is a classical problem in online algorithms and we know that both the deterministic fractional and randomized integral online matchings achieve the same competitive ratio of 1-1/e. In this work, we study classes of graphs where the online degree is restricted to 2. As expected, one can achieve a competitive ratio of better than 1-1/e in both the deterministic fractional and randomized integral cases, but surprisingly, these ratios are not the same. It was already known that for fractional matching, a 0.75 competitive ratio algorithm is optimal. We show that the folklore Half-Half algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of η ≈ 0.717772… and more surprisingly, show that this is optimal by giving a matching lower-bound. This yields a separation between the two problems: deterministic fractional and randomized integral, showing that it is impossible to obtain a perfect rounding scheme.

Cite as

Amey Bhangale, Arghya Chakraborty, and Prahladh Harsha. Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 13:1-13:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bhangale_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13,
  author =	{Bhangale, Amey and Chakraborty, Arghya and Harsha, Prahladh},
  title =	{{Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249216},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithm, Bipartite matching}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.32

Time-Optimal k-Server

Authors: Fabian Frei, Dennis Komm, Moritz Stocker, and Philip Whittington

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract

The time-optimal k-server problem minimizes the time spent instead of the distance traveled when serving n requests, appearing one after the other, with k servers in a metric space. The classical distance model was motivated by a hard disk with k heads. Instead of minimal head movements, the time model aims for optimal reading speeds. This paper provides a lower bound of 2k-1 on the competitive ratio of any deterministic online algorithm for the time-optimal k-server problem on a specifically designed metric space. This lower bound coincides with the best known upper bound on the competitive ratio for the classical k-server problem, achieved by the famous work function algorithm. We provide further lower bounds of k+1 for all Euclidean spaces and k for uniform metric spaces. Our most technical result, proven by applying Yao’s principle to a suitable instance distribution, is a lower bound of k+H_k-1 that holds even for randomized algorithms, which contrasts with the best known lower bound for the classical problem, which is polylogarithmic in k. We hope to initiate further intensive study of this natural problem.

Cite as

Fabian Frei, Dennis Komm, Moritz Stocker, and Philip Whittington. Time-Optimal k-Server. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 32:1-32:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{frei_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.32,
  author =	{Frei, Fabian and Komm, Dennis and Stocker, Moritz and Whittington, Philip},
  title =	{{Time-Optimal k-Server}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249407},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: k-server problem, optimizing time instead of distance, deterministic and randomized algorithms, Yao’s principle}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.24

Multidimensional Blockchain Fees Are (Essentially) Optimal

Authors: Guillermo Angeris, Theo Diamandis, and Ciamac Moallemi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract

In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, dynamic multidimensional blockchain fee markets have strong performance guarantees, even against worst-case adversaries. In particular, we show that the average welfare gap between the following two scenarios is at most O(1/√T), where T is the length of the time horizon considered. In the first scenario, the designer knows all future actions by users and is allowed to fix the optimal prices of resources ahead of time, based on the designer’s oracular knowledge of those actions. In the second, the prices are updated by a very simple algorithm that does not have this oracular knowledge, special cases of which are EIP-4844 and EIP-1559, both fee mechanisms used by the Ethereum blockchain. Roughly speaking, this means that, on average, over a reasonable timescale, there is no difference in welfare between "correctly" fixing the prices, with oracular knowledge of the future, when compared to the proposed algorithm. We show a matching lower bound of Ω(1/√T) for any implementable algorithm and also separately consider the case where the adversary is known to be stochastic.

Cite as

Guillermo Angeris, Theo Diamandis, and Ciamac Moallemi. Multidimensional Blockchain Fees Are (Essentially) Optimal. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 24:1-24:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{angeris_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.24,
  author =	{Angeris, Guillermo and Diamandis, Theo and Moallemi, Ciamac},
  title =	{{Multidimensional Blockchain Fees Are (Essentially) Optimal}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247433},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, transaction fees, online optimization, convex optimization}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52

Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary

Authors: Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract

One of the classic problems in online decision-making is the secretary problem, where the goal is to hire the best secretary out of n rankable applicants or, in a natural extension, to maximize the probability of selecting the largest number from a sequence arriving in random order. Many works have considered generalizations of this problem where one can accept multiple values subject to a combinatorial constraint. The seminal work of Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg (SODA'07, JACM'18) proposed the matroid secretary conjecture, suggesting that there exists an O(1)-competitive algorithm for the matroid constraint, and many works since have attempted to obtain algorithms for both general matroids and specific classes of matroids. The ultimate goal of these results is to obtain an e-competitive algorithm, and the strong matroid secretary conjecture states that this is possible for general matroids. One of the most important classes of matroids is the graphic matroid, where a set of edges in a graph is deemed independent if it contains no cycle. Given the rich combinatorial structure of graphs, obtaining algorithms for these matroids is often seen as a good first step towards solving the problem for general matroids. For matroid secretary, Babaioff et al. (SODA'07, JACM'18) first studied graphic matroid case and obtained a 16-competitive algorithm. Subsequent works have improved the competitive ratio, most recently to 4 by Soto, Turkieltaub, and Verdugo (SODA'18). In this paper, we break the 4-competitive barrier for the problem, obtaining a new algorithm with a competitive ratio of 3.95. For the special case of simple graphs (i.e., graphs that do not contain parallel edges) we further improve this to 3.77. Intuitively, solving the problem for simple graphs is easier as they do not contain cycles of length two. A natural question that arises is whether we can obtain a ratio arbitrarily close to e by assuming the graph has a large enough girth. We answer this question affirmatively, proving that one can obtain a competitive ratio arbitrarily close to e even for constant values of girth, providing further evidence for the strong matroid secretary conjecture. We further show that this bound is tight: for any constant g, one cannot obtain a competitive ratio better than e even if we assume that the input graph has girth at least g. To our knowledge, such a bound was not previously known even for simple graphs.

Cite as

Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski. Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 52:1-52:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{banihashem_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52,
  author =	{Banihashem, Kiarash and Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi and Kowalski, Dariusz R. and Krysta, Piotr and Mittal, Danny and Olkowski, Jan},
  title =	{{Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{52:1--52:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245205},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  annote =	{Keywords: online algorithms, graphic matroids, secretary problem}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.91

Near-Optimal Differentially Private Graph Algorithms via the Multidimensional AboveThreshold Mechanism

Authors: Laxman Dhulipala, Monika Henzinger, George Z. Li, Quanquan C. Liu, A. R. Sricharan, and Leqi Zhu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract

Many differentially private and classical non-private graph algorithms rely crucially on determining whether some property of each vertex meets a threshold. For example, for the k-core decomposition problem, the classic peeling algorithm iteratively removes a vertex if its induced degree falls below a threshold. The sparse vector technique (SVT) is generally used to transform non-private threshold queries into private ones with only a small additive loss in accuracy. However, a naive application of SVT in the graph setting leads to an amplification of the error by a factor of n due to composition, as SVT is applied to every vertex. In this paper, we resolve this problem by formulating a novel generalized sparse vector technique which we call the Multidimensional AboveThreshold (MAT) Mechanism which generalizes SVT (applied to vectors with one dimension) to vectors with multiple dimensions. When applied to vectors with n dimensions, we solve a number of important graph problems with better bounds than previous work. Specifically, we apply our MAT mechanism to obtain a set of improved bounds for a variety of problems including k-core decomposition, densest subgraph, low out-degree ordering, and vertex coloring. We give a tight local edge differentially private (LEDP) algorithm for k-core decomposition that results in an approximation with O(ε^{-1} log n) additive error and no multiplicative error in O(n) rounds. We also give a new (2+η)-factor multiplicative, O(ε^{-1} log n) additive error algorithm in O(log² n) rounds for any constant η > 0. Both of these results are asymptotically tight against our new lower bound of Ω(log n) for any constant-factor approximation algorithm for k-core decomposition. Our new algorithms for k-core decomposition also directly lead to new algorithms for the related problems of densest subgraph and low out-degree ordering. Finally, we give novel LEDP differentially private defective coloring algorithms that use number of colors given in terms of the arboricity of the graph.

Cite as

Laxman Dhulipala, Monika Henzinger, George Z. Li, Quanquan C. Liu, A. R. Sricharan, and Leqi Zhu. Near-Optimal Differentially Private Graph Algorithms via the Multidimensional AboveThreshold Mechanism. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 91:1-91:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{dhulipala_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.91,
  author =	{Dhulipala, Laxman and Henzinger, Monika and Li, George Z. and Liu, Quanquan C. and Sricharan, A. R. and Zhu, Leqi},
  title =	{{Near-Optimal Differentially Private Graph Algorithms via the Multidimensional AboveThreshold Mechanism}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{91:1--91:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.91},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245601},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.91},
  annote =	{Keywords: differential privacy, abovethreshold, densest subgraph}
}

Document

Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58

A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems

Authors: Flavio Chierichetti, Mirko Giacchini, Alessandro Panconesi, and Andrea Vattani

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract

Online Bipartite Matching with random user arrival is a fundamental problem in the online advertisement ecosystem. Over the last 30 years, many algorithms and impossibility results have been developed for this problem. In particular, the latest impossibility result was established by Manshadi, Oveis Gharan and Saberi [Manshadi et al., 2011] in 2011. Since then, several algorithms have been published in an effort to narrow the gap between the upper and the lower bounds on the competitive ratio. In this paper we show that no algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 1- e/(e^e) = 0.82062…, improving upon the 0.823 upper bound presented in [Manshadi et al., 2011]. Our construction is simple to state, accompanied by a fully analytic proof, and yields a competitive ratio bound intriguingly similar to 1 - 1/e, the optimal competitive ratio for the fully adversarial Online Bipartite Matching problem. Although the tightness of our upper bound remains an open question, we show that our construction is extremal in a natural class of instances.

Cite as

Flavio Chierichetti, Mirko Giacchini, Alessandro Panconesi, and Andrea Vattani. A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 58:1-58:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chierichetti_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58,
  author =	{Chierichetti, Flavio and Giacchini, Mirko and Panconesi, Alessandro and Vattani, Andrea},
  title =	{{A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234354},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bipartite Matching, Random Graphs, Competitive Ratio}
}

Document

Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98

The Long Arm of Nashian Allocation in Online p-Mean Welfare Maximization

Authors: Zhiyi Huang, Chui Shan Lee, Xinkai Shu, and Zhaozi Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract

We study the online allocation of divisible items to n agents with additive valuations for p-mean welfare maximization, a problem introduced by Barman, Khan, and Maiti (2022). Our algorithmic and hardness results characterize the optimal competitive ratios for the entire spectrum of -∞ ≤ p ≤ 1. Surprisingly, our improved algorithms for all p ≤ (1)/(log n) are simply the greedy algorithm for the Nash welfare, supplemented with two auxiliary components to ensure all agents have non-zero utilities and to help a small number of agents with low utilities. In this sense, the long arm of Nashian allocation achieves near-optimal competitive ratios not only for Nash welfare but also all the way to egalitarian welfare.

Cite as

Zhiyi Huang, Chui Shan Lee, Xinkai Shu, and Zhaozi Wang. The Long Arm of Nashian Allocation in Online p-Mean Welfare Maximization. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 98:1-98:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{huang_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98,
  author =	{Huang, Zhiyi and Lee, Chui Shan and Shu, Xinkai and Wang, Zhaozi},
  title =	{{The Long Arm of Nashian Allocation in Online p-Mean Welfare Maximization}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{98:1--98:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234754},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithms, Fair Division, Nash Welfare}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84

Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions

Authors: Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract

We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using quantum communication can be more efficient than classical communication. We have two sets of results, revealing a surprisingly rich landscape - which looks quite different from both quantum communication in non-strategic parties, and classical communication in mechanism design. We first study the expected communication complexity of approximately optimal auctions. We give quantum auction protocols for buyers with unit-demand or combinatorial valuations that obtain an arbitrarily good approximation of the optimal revenue while running in exponentially more efficient communication compared to classical approximately optimal auctions. However, these auctions come with the caveat that they may require the seller to charge exponentially large payments from a deviating buyer. We show that this caveat is necessary - we give an exponential lower bound on the product of the expected quantum communication and the maximum payment. We then study the worst-case communication complexity of exactly optimal auctions in an extremely simple setting: additive buyer’s valuations over two items. We show the following separations: - There exists a prior where the optimal classical auction protocol requires infinitely many bits, but a one-way message of 1 qubit and 2 classical bits suffices. - There exists a prior where no finite one-way quantum auction protocol can obtain the optimal revenue. However, there is a barely-interactive revenue-optimal quantum auction protocol with the following simple structure: the seller prepares a pair of qubits in the EPR state, sends one of them to the buyer, and then the buyer sends 1 qubit and 2 classical bits. - There exists a prior where no multi-round quantum auction protocol with a finite bound on communication complexity can obtain the optimal revenue.

Cite as

Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou. Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 84:1-84:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{rubinstein_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84,
  author =	{Rubinstein, Aviad and Zhou, Zixin},
  title =	{{Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{84:1--84:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227124},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, Communication complexity, Quantum computing}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.73

Laminar Matroid Secretary: Greedy Strikes Back

Authors: Zhiyi Huang, Zahra Parsaeian, and Zixuan Zhu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 308, 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)

Abstract

We show that a simple greedy algorithm is 4.75-competitive for the Laminar Matroid Secretary Problem, improving the 3√3 ≈ 5.196-competitive algorithm based on the forbidden sets technique (Soto, Turkieltaub, and Verdugo, 2018).

Cite as

Zhiyi Huang, Zahra Parsaeian, and Zixuan Zhu. Laminar Matroid Secretary: Greedy Strikes Back. In 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 308, pp. 73:1-73:8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{huang_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2024.73,
  author =	{Huang, Zhiyi and Parsaeian, Zahra and Zhu, Zixuan},
  title =	{{Laminar Matroid Secretary: Greedy Strikes Back}},
  booktitle =	{32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)},
  pages =	{73:1--73:8},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-338-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{308},
  editor =	{Chan, Timothy and Fischer, Johannes and Iacono, John and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.73},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-211443},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.73},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matroid Secretary, Greedy Algorithm, Laminar Matroid}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.75

Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions

Authors: Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, and Tao Xiao

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)

Abstract

This paper proves the tight sample complexity of Second-Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve, up to a logarithmic factor, for each of all the value distribution families studied in the literature: [0,1]-bounded, [1,H]-bounded, regular, and monotone hazard rate (MHR). Remarkably, the setting-specific tight sample complexity poly(ε^{-1}) depends on the precision ε ∈ (0, 1), but not on the number of bidders n ≥ 1. Further, in the two bounded-support settings, our learning algorithm allows correlated value distributions. In contrast, the tight sample complexity Θ̃(n) ⋅ poly(ε^{-1}) of Myerson Auction proved by Guo, Huang and Zhang (STOC 2019) has a nearly-linear dependence on n ≥ 1, and holds only for independent value distributions in every setting. We follow a similar framework as the Guo-Huang-Zhang work, but replace their information theoretical arguments with a direct proof.

Cite as

Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, and Tao Xiao. Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 75:1-75:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{jin_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.75,
  author =	{Jin, Yaonan and Lu, Pinyan and Xiao, Tao},
  title =	{{Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)},
  pages =	{75:1--75:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-263-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{251},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.75},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-175780},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.75},
  annote =	{Keywords: Revenue Maximization, Sample Complexity, Anonymous Reserve}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LITES.8.1.1

Susceptibility to Image Resolution in Face Recognition and Training Strategies to Enhance Robustness

Authors: Martin Knoche, Stefan Hörmann, and Gerhard Rigoll

Published in: LITES, Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022): Special Issue on Embedded Systems for Computer Vision. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 8, Issue 1

Abstract

Many face recognition approaches expect the input images to have similar image resolution. However, in real-world applications, the image resolution varies due to different image capture mechanisms or sources, affecting the performance of face recognition systems. This work first analyzes the image resolution susceptibility of modern face recognition. Face verification on the very popular LFW dataset drops from 99.23% accuracy to almost 55% when image dimensions of both images are reduced to arguable very poor resolution. With cross-resolution image pairs (one HR and one LR image), face verification accuracy is even worse. This characteristic is investigated more in-depth by analyzing the feature distances utilized for face verification. To increase the robustness, we propose two training strategies applied to a state-of-the-art face recognition model: 1) Training with 50% low resolution images within each batch and 2) using the cosine distance loss between high and low resolution features in a siamese network structure. Both methods significantly boost face verification accuracy for matching training and testing image resolutions. Training a network with different resolutions simultaneously instead of adding only one specific low resolution showed improvements across all resolutions and made a single model applicable to unknown resolutions. However, models trained for one particular low resolution perform better when using the exact resolution for testing. We improve the face verification accuracy from 96.86% to 97.72% on the popular LFW database with uniformly distributed image dimensions between 112 × 112 px and 5 × 5 px. Our approaches improve face verification accuracy even more from 77.56% to 87.17% for distributions focusing on lower images resolutions. Lastly, we propose specific image dimension sets focusing on high, mid, and low resolution for five well-known datasets to benchmark face verification accuracy in cross-resolution scenarios.

Cite as

Martin Knoche, Stefan Hörmann, and Gerhard Rigoll. Susceptibility to Image Resolution in Face Recognition and Training Strategies to Enhance Robustness. In LITES, Volume 8, Issue 1 (2022): Special Issue on Embedded Systems for Computer Vision. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp. 01:1-01:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@Article{knoche_et_al:LITES.8.1.1,
  author =	{Knoche, Martin and H\"{o}rmann, Stefan and Rigoll, Gerhard},
  title =	{{Susceptibility to Image Resolution in Face Recognition and Training Strategies to Enhance Robustness}},
  journal =	{Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems},
  pages =	{01:1--01:20},
  ISSN =	{2199-2002},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{8},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LITES.8.1.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192889},
  doi =		{10.4230/LITES.8.1.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: recognition, resolution, cross, face, identification}
}

Document

Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.73

Scalable and Jointly Differentially Private Packing

Authors: Zhiyi Huang and Xue Zhu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 132, 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019)

Abstract

We introduce an (epsilon, delta)-jointly differentially private algorithm for packing problems. Our algorithm not only achieves the optimal trade-off between the privacy parameter epsilon and the minimum supply requirement (up to logarithmic factors), but is also scalable in the sense that the running time is linear in the number of agents n. Previous algorithms either run in cubic time in n, or require a minimum supply per resource that is sqrt{n} times larger than the best possible.

Cite as

Zhiyi Huang and Xue Zhu. Scalable and Jointly Differentially Private Packing. In 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 132, pp. 73:1-73:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{huang_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.73,
  author =	{Huang, Zhiyi and Zhu, Xue},
  title =	{{Scalable and Jointly Differentially Private Packing}},
  booktitle =	{46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019)},
  pages =	{73:1--73:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-109-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{132},
  editor =	{Baier, Christel and Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Flocchini, Paola and Leonardi, Stefano},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.73},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-106498},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.73},
  annote =	{Keywords: Joint differential privacy, packing, scalable algorithms}
}

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