14 Search Results for "Christodoulou, George"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27
The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs

Authors: George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamária Kovács, and Ioannis Vlachos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
We study truthful and non-truthful protocols for combinatorial auctions in which every item can be allocated to one of two agents (multigraphs), or more generally to a fixed number of agents (hypergraphs). We show some tight - both positive and impossibility - results for the communication complexity of approximating the optimal social welfare for general monotone, subadditive, or XOS valuations.
Cite as

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamária Kovács, and Ioannis Vlachos. The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 27:1-27:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{christodoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27,
  author =	{Christodoulou, George and Koutsoupias, Elias and Kov\'{a}cs, Annam\'{a}ria and Vlachos, Ioannis},
  title =	{{The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255163},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Communication Complexity, Mechanism Design, Graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.58
A Polylogarithmic Competitive Algorithm for Stochastic Online Sorting and TSP

Authors: Andreas Kalavas, Charalampos Platanos, and Thanos Tolias

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
In Online Sorting, an array of n initially empty cells is given. At each time step t, an element x_t ∈ [0,1] arrives and must be irrevocably placed in an empty cell without knowledge of future arrivals. We aim to minimize the sum of absolute differences between pairs of elements placed in consecutive array cells, seeking an online placement strategy that results in a final array close to a sorted one. An interesting multidimensional generalization, referred to as the Online Traveling Salesperson Problem, arises when the request sequence consists of points in the d-dimensional unit cube and the objective is to minimize the sum of Euclidean distances between points in consecutive cells. Motivated by the recent work of (Abrahamsen, Bercea, Beretta, Klausen and Kozma; ESA 2024), we consider the stochastic version of Online Sorting (resp. Online TSP), where each element (resp. point) x_t is an i.i.d. sample from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] (resp. [0,1]^d). By carefully decomposing the request sequence into a hierarchy of balls-into-bins instances, where the balls to bins ratio is large enough so that bin occupancy is sharply concentrated around its mean and small enough so that we can efficiently deal with the elements placed in the same bin, we obtain an online algorithm that approximates the optimal cost within a factor of O(log² n) with high probability. Our result comprises an exponential improvement over the previously best known competitive ratio of Õ(n^{1/4}) for Stochastic Online Sorting due to (Abrahamsen et al.; ESA 2024) and O(√n) for (adversarial) Online TSP due to (Bertram, ESA 2025).
Cite as

Andreas Kalavas, Charalampos Platanos, and Thanos Tolias. A Polylogarithmic Competitive Algorithm for Stochastic Online Sorting and TSP. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 58:1-58:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{kalavas_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.58,
  author =	{Kalavas, Andreas and Platanos, Charalampos and Tolias, Thanos},
  title =	{{A Polylogarithmic Competitive Algorithm for Stochastic Online Sorting and TSP}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255473},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: sorting, online algorithm, balls-into-bins, TSP}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2026.32
Mean-Payoff and Energy Discrete-Bidding Games

Authors: Guy Avni and Suman Sadhukhan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 363, 34th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2026)

Abstract
A bidding game is played on a graph as follows. A token is placed on an initial vertex and both players are allocated budgets. In each turn, the players simultaneously submit bids that do not exceed their available budgets, the higher bidder moves the token, and pays the bid to the lower bidder. We focus on discrete-bidding, which are motivated by practical applications and restrict the granularity of the players' bids, e.g, bids must be given in cents. We study, for the first time, discrete-bidding games with mean-payoff and energy objectives. In contrast, mean-payoff continuous-bidding games (i.e., no granularity restrictions) are understood and exhibit a rich mathematical structure. The threshold budget is a necessary and sufficient initial budget for winning an energy game or guaranteeing a target payoff in a mean-payoff game. We first establish existence of threshold budgets; a non-trivial property due to the concurrent moves of the players. Moreover, we identify the structure of the thresholds, which is key in obtaining compact strategies, and in turn, showing that finding threshold is in NP and coNP even in succinctly-represented games.
Cite as

Guy Avni and Suman Sadhukhan. Mean-Payoff and Energy Discrete-Bidding Games. In 34th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 363, pp. 32:1-32:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{avni_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2026.32,
  author =	{Avni, Guy and Sadhukhan, Suman},
  title =	{{Mean-Payoff and Energy Discrete-Bidding Games}},
  booktitle =	{34th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2026)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-411-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{363},
  editor =	{Guerrini, Stefano and K\"{o}nig, Barbara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2026.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-254573},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2026.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bidding games, Discrete-bidding, Mean-payoff games, energy games}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.12
Timeline Problems in Temporal Graphs: Vertex Cover vs. Dominating Set

Authors: Anton Herrmann, Christian Komusiewicz, Nils Morawietz, and Frank Sommer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 358, 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)

Abstract
A temporal graph is a finite sequence of graphs, called snapshots, over the same vertex set. Many temporal graph problems turn out to be much more difficult than their static counterparts. One such problem is Timeline Vertex Cover (also known as MinTimeline_∞), a temporal analogue to the classical Vertex Cover problem. In this problem, one is given a temporal graph 𝒢 and two integers k and 𝓁, and the goal is to cover each edge of each snapshot by selecting for each vertex at most k activity intervals of length at most 𝓁 each. Here, an edge uv in the ith snapshot is covered, if an activity interval of u or v is active at time i. In this work, we continue the algorithmic study of Timeline Vertex Cover and introduce the Timeline Dominating Set problem where we want to dominate all vertices in each snapshot by the selected activity intervals. We analyze both problems from a classical and parameterized point of view and also consider partial problem versions, where the goal is to cover (dominate) at least t edges (vertices) of the snapshots. With respect to the parameterized complexity, we consider the temporal graph parameters vertex-interval-membership-width (vimw) and interval-membership-width (imw). We show that all considered problems admit FPT-algorithms when parameterized by vimw+k+𝓁. This provides a smaller parameter combination than the ones used for previously known FPT-algorithms for Timeline Vertex Cover. Surprisingly, for imw+k+𝓁, Timeline Dominating Set turns out to be easier than Timeline Vertex Cover, by also admitting an FPT-algorithm, whereas the vertex cover version is NP-hard even if imw+k+𝓁 is constant. We also consider parameterization by combinations of n, the vertex set size, with k or 𝓁 and parameterization by t. Here, we show for example that both partial problems are fixed-parameter tractable for t which significantly improves and generalizes a previous result for a special case of Partial Timeline Vertex Cover with k = 1.
Cite as

Anton Herrmann, Christian Komusiewicz, Nils Morawietz, and Frank Sommer. Timeline Problems in Temporal Graphs: Vertex Cover vs. Dominating Set. In 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 358, pp. 12:1-12:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{herrmann_et_al:LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.12,
  author =	{Herrmann, Anton and Komusiewicz, Christian and Morawietz, Nils and Sommer, Frank},
  title =	{{Timeline Problems in Temporal Graphs: Vertex Cover vs. Dominating Set}},
  booktitle =	{20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-407-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{358},
  editor =	{Agrawal, Akanksha and van Leeuwen, Erik Jan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251446},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: NP-hard problem, FPT-algorithm, interval-membership-width, Color coding}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9
ε-Stationary Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Stochastic Graph Games

Authors: Ali Asadi, Léonard Brice, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and K. S. Thejaswini

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an ε-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ε by unilaterally deviating from their strategy. In this work, we use ε-Nash equilibria to approximate the computation of Nash equilibria. Specifically, we focus on turn-based, multiplayer stochastic games played on graphs, where players are restricted to stationary strategies - strategies that use randomness but not memory. The problem of deciding the constrained existence of stationary Nash equilibria - where each player’s payoff must lie within a given interval - is known to be ∃ℝ-complete in such a setting (Hansen and Sølvsten, 2020). We extend this line of work to stationary ε-Nash equilibria and present an algorithm that solves the following promise problem: given a game with a Nash equilibrium satisfying the constraints, compute an ε-Nash equilibrium that ε-satisfies those same constraints - satisfies the constraints up to an ε additive error. Our algorithm runs in FNP^NP time. To achieve this, we first show that if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then one exists where the non-zero probabilities are at least an inverse of a double-exponential in the input. We further prove that such a strategy can be encoded using floating-point representations, as in the work of Frederiksen and Miltersen (2013), which finally gives us our FNP^NP algorithm. We further show that the decision version of the promise problem is NP-hard. Finally, we show a partial tightness result by proving a lower bound for such techniques: if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then there must be one where the probabilities in the strategies are double-exponentially small.
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Ali Asadi, Léonard Brice, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and K. S. Thejaswini. ε-Stationary Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Stochastic Graph Games. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 9:1-9:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{asadi_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9,
  author =	{Asadi, Ali and Brice, L\'{e}onard and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Thejaswini, K. S.},
  title =	{{\epsilon-Stationary Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Stochastic Graph Games}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250897},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nash Equilibria, \epsilon-Nash equilibria, Approximation, Existential Theory of Reals}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15
Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes

Authors: Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs," EC 2023) establishes the existence of EFX allocations for graphical valuations, when agents are vertices in a graph, items are edges, and each item has zero value for all agents other than those at its endpoints. Thus, in this setting, each good has non-zero value for at most two agents, and there is at most one good valued by any pair of agents. This marks one of the few cases when an exact and complete EFX allocation is known to exist for more than three agents. In this work, we partially extend these results to multi-graphs, when each pair of vertices can have more than one edge between them. The existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs is a natural open question given their existence in simple graphs. We show that EFX allocations exist, and can be computed in polynomial time, for agents with cancelable valuations in the following cases: (i) bipartite multi-graphs, (ii) multi-trees with monotone valuations, and (iii) multi-graphs with girth (2t-1), where t is the chromatic number of the multi-graph. The existence of EFX in cycle multi-graphs follows from (i), (iii), and the known existence of EFX for three agents.
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Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit. Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 15:1-15:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bhaskar_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15,
  author =	{Bhaskar, Umang and Pandit, Yeshwant},
  title =	{{Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250958},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Division, EFX, Multi-graphs}
}
Document
APPROX
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9
Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects

Authors: Miriam Fischer, Dario Paccagnan, and Cosimo Vinci

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 353, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)

Abstract
In this work we study online optimization problems with congestion effects. These are problems where tasks arrive online and a decision maker is required to allocate them on the fly to available resources in order to minimize the cost suffered, which grows with the amount of resources used. This class of problems corresponds to the online counterpart of well-known studied problems, including optimization problems with diseconomies of scale [Konstantin Makarychev and Maxim Sviridenko, 2018], minimum cost in congestion games [Gairing and Paccagnan, 2023], and load balancing problems [Baruch Awerbuch et al., 1995]. Within this setting, our work settles the problem of designing online algorithms with optimal competitive ratio, i.e., algorithms whose incurred cost is as close as possible to that of an oracle with complete knowledge of the future instance ahead of time. We provide three contributions underpinning this result. First, we show that no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio below a given factor depending solely on the resource costs. Second, we show that, when guided by carefully modified cost functions, the greedy algorithm achieves a competitive ratio matching this lower bound and thus is optimal. Finally, we show how to compute such modified cost functions in polynomial time.
Cite as

Miriam Fischer, Dario Paccagnan, and Cosimo Vinci. Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 353, pp. 9:1-9:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{fischer_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9,
  author =	{Fischer, Miriam and Paccagnan, Dario and Vinci, Cosimo},
  title =	{{Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects}},
  booktitle =	{Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-397-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{353},
  editor =	{Ene, Alina and Chattopadhyay, Eshan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-243754},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithms, Competitive Ratio, Algorithmic Game Theory, Greedy Algorithms, Congestion Games}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.WADS.2025.31
Repairing Schedules by Removing Waiting Times: A Parameterized Complexity Analysis

Authors: Niels Grüttemeier and Klaus Heeger

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 349, 19th International Symposium on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS 2025)

Abstract
We consider the problem of repairing production schedules in a job-shop setting by reducing pre-planned waiting times. Herein, a schedule of all jobs is given. To compensate unforeseen disturbances, this schedule contains waiting times between the execution of two consecutive tasks of a job. Further, we assume that the schedule temporarily overloads some machines, e.g. due to reduced machine capacities because of worker sickness or (partially) broken machines. We study the problem of removing as few waiting times as possible in order to eliminate the machine overloads. After formalizing this problem, we perform an extensive analysis of its parameterized complexity with respect to several natural parameters, resulting in a detailed picture of the problem’s complexity.
Cite as

Niels Grüttemeier and Klaus Heeger. Repairing Schedules by Removing Waiting Times: A Parameterized Complexity Analysis. In 19th International Symposium on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 349, pp. 31:1-31:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gruttemeier_et_al:LIPIcs.WADS.2025.31,
  author =	{Gr\"{u}ttemeier, Niels and Heeger, Klaus},
  title =	{{Repairing Schedules by Removing Waiting Times: A Parameterized Complexity Analysis}},
  booktitle =	{19th International Symposium on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS 2025)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-398-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{349},
  editor =	{Morin, Pat and Oh, Eunjin},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.WADS.2025.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-242624},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.WADS.2025.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Job shop, parallel machines, reactive scheduling}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21
On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the performance of mildly greedy players in k-coloring games, a relevant subclass of anti-coordination games. A mildly greedy player is a selfish agent who is willing to deviate from a certain strategy profile only if her payoff improves by a factor of more than ε, for some given ε ≥ 0. In presence of mildly greedy players, stability is captured by the concept of (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we first show that, for any k-coloring game, the (1+ε)-approximate price of anarchy, i.e., the price of anarchy of (1+ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibria, is at least (k-1)/((k-1)ε +k), and that this bound is tight for any ε ≥ 0. Then, we evaluate the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk starting from any initial strategy profile, where a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk is a sequence of (1 + ε)-approximate best-responses, one for each player. We provide a lower bound of min{(k-2)/k, (k-1)/((k-1)ε+k)} on this ratio, for any ε ≥ 0 and k ≥ 5; for the cases of k = 3 and k = 4, we give finer bounds depending on ε. Our work generalizes the results known for cut games, the special case of k-coloring games restricted to k = 2.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano. On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 21:1-21:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and D'Ascenzo, Andrea and D'Emidio, Mattia and Italiano, Giuseppe F.},
  title =	{{On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241287},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coloring games, (Approximate) Nash Equilibria, Price of Anarchy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions

Authors: Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Xizhi Tan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)

Abstract
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ronen [Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen, 1999] studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrelated machines aiming to minimize the makespan. They provided a strategyproof mechanism that achieves an n-approximation and they made the bold conjecture that this is the best approximation achievable by any deterministic strategyproof scheduling mechanism. After more than two decades and several efforts, n remains the best known approximation and very recent work by Christodoulou et al. [George Christodoulou et al., 2021] has been able to prove an Ω(√n) approximation lower bound for all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. This strong negative result, however, heavily depends on the fact that the performance of these mechanisms is evaluated using worst-case analysis. To overcome such overly pessimistic, and often uninformative, worst-case bounds, a surge of recent work has focused on the "learning-augmented framework", whose goal is to leverage machine-learned predictions to obtain improved approximations when these predictions are accurate (consistency), while also achieving near-optimal worst-case approximations even when the predictions are arbitrarily wrong (robustness). In this work, we study the classic strategic scheduling problem of Nisan and Ronen [Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen, 1999] using the learning-augmented framework and give a deterministic polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism that is 6-consistent and 2n-robust. We thus achieve the "best of both worlds": an O(1) consistency and an O(n) robustness that asymptotically matches the best-known approximation. We then extend this result to provide more general worst-case approximation guarantees as a function of the prediction error. Finally, we complement our positive results by showing that any 1-consistent deterministic strategyproof mechanism has unbounded robustness.
Cite as

Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Xizhi Tan. Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 11:1-11:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{balkanski_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11,
  author =	{Balkanski, Eric and Gkatzelis, Vasilis and Tan, Xizhi},
  title =	{{Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions}},
  booktitle =	{14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-263-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{251},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-175143},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design with Predictions, Strategyproof Scheduling}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2021.56
Truthful Allocation in Graphs and Hypergraphs

Authors: George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, and Annamária Kovács

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 198, 48th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2021)

Abstract
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines scheduling problem, in which every given task can be executed only by two pre-specified machines in the case of graphs or a given subset of machines in the case of hypergraphs. This corresponds to a multigraph whose nodes are the machines and its hyperedges are the tasks. This class of problems belongs to multidimensional mechanism design, for which there are no known general mechanisms other than the VCG and its generalization to affine minimizers. We propose a new class of mechanisms that are truthful and have significantly better performance than affine minimizers in many settings. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for general multigraphs, as well as special classes of graphs such as stars, trees, planar graphs, k-degenerate graphs, and graphs of a given treewidth. We also consider the objective of minimizing or maximizing the L^p-norm of the values of the players, a generalization of the makespan minimization that corresponds to p = ∞, and extend the results to any p > 0.
Cite as

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, and Annamária Kovács. Truthful Allocation in Graphs and Hypergraphs. In 48th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 198, pp. 56:1-56:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{christodoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2021.56,
  author =	{Christodoulou, George and Koutsoupias, Elias and Kov\'{a}cs, Annam\'{a}ria},
  title =	{{Truthful Allocation in Graphs and Hypergraphs}},
  booktitle =	{48th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2021)},
  pages =	{56:1--56:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-195-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{198},
  editor =	{Bansal, Nikhil and Merelli, Emanuela and Worrell, James},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2021.56},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-141256},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2021.56},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic Game Theory, Scheduling Unrelated Machines, Mechanism Design}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.32
Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games

Authors: George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, and Clara Waldmann

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 168, 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)

Abstract
We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria (α-PNE) in weighted atomic congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d. Previously it was known that d-approximate equilibria always exist, while nonexistence was established only for small constants, namely for 1.153-PNE. We improve significantly upon this gap, proving that such games in general do not have Θ̃(√d)-approximate PNE, which provides the first super-constant lower bound. Furthermore, we provide a black-box gap-introducing method of combining such nonexistence results with a specific circuit gadget, in order to derive NP-completeness of the decision version of the problem. In particular, deploying this technique we are able to show that deciding whether a weighted congestion game has an Õ(√d)-PNE is NP-complete. Previous hardness results were known only for the special case of exact equilibria and arbitrary cost functions. The circuit gadget is of independent interest and it allows us to also prove hardness for a variety of problems related to the complexity of PNE in congestion games. For example, we demonstrate that the question of existence of α-PNE in which a certain set of players plays a specific strategy profile is NP-hard for any α < 3^(d/2), even for unweighted congestion games. Finally, we study the existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games with general (nondecreasing) costs, as a function of the number of players n. We show that n-PNE always exist, matched by an almost tight nonexistence bound of Θ̃(n) which we can again transform into an NP-completeness proof for the decision problem.
Cite as

George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, and Clara Waldmann. Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games. In 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 168, pp. 32:1-32:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{christodoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.32,
  author =	{Christodoulou, George and Gairing, Martin and Giannakopoulos, Yiannis and Po\c{c}as, Diogo and Waldmann, Clara},
  title =	{{Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games}},
  booktitle =	{47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-138-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{168},
  editor =	{Czumaj, Artur and Dawar, Anuj and Merelli, Emanuela},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-124392},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: Atomic congestion games, existence of equilibria, pure Nash equilibria, approximate equilibria, hardness of equilibria}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.150
The Price of Stability of Weighted Congestion Games

Authors: George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, and Paul G. Spirakis

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 107, 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)

Abstract
We give exponential lower bounds on the Price of Stability (PoS) of weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions. In particular, for any positive integer d we construct rather simple games with cost functions of degree at most d which have a PoS of at least Omega(Phi_d)^{d+1}, where Phi_d ~ d/ln d is the unique positive root of equation x^{d+1}=(x+1)^d. This essentially closes the huge gap between Theta(d) and Phi_d^{d+1} and asymptotically matches the Price of Anarchy upper bound. We further show that the PoS remains exponential even for singleton games. More generally, we also provide a lower bound of Omega((1+1/alpha)^d/d) on the PoS of alpha-approximate Nash equilibria, even for singleton games. All our lower bounds extend to network congestion games, and hold for mixed and correlated equilibria as well. On the positive side, we give a general upper bound on the PoS of alpha-approximate Nash equilibria, which is sensitive to the range W of the player weights and the approximation parameter alpha. We do this by explicitly constructing a novel approximate potential function, based on Faulhaber's formula, that generalizes Rosenthal's potential in a continuous, analytic way. From the general theorem, we deduce two interesting corollaries. First, we derive the existence of an approximate pure Nash equilibrium with PoS at most (d+3)/2; the equilibrium's approximation parameter ranges from Theta(1) to d+1 in a smooth way with respect to W. Secondly, we show that for unweighted congestion games, the PoS of alpha-approximate Nash equilibria is at most (d+1)/alpha.
Cite as

George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, and Paul G. Spirakis. The Price of Stability of Weighted Congestion Games. In 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 107, pp. 150:1-150:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{christodoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.150,
  author =	{Christodoulou, George and Gairing, Martin and Giannakopoulos, Yiannis and Spirakis, Paul G.},
  title =	{{The Price of Stability of Weighted Congestion Games}},
  booktitle =	{45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)},
  pages =	{150:1--150:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-076-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{107},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, D\'{a}niel and Sannella, Donald},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.150},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-91541},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.150},
  annote =	{Keywords: Congestion games, price of stability, Nash equilibrium, approximate equilibrium, potential games}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2016.30
Strategic Contention Resolution with Limited Feedback

Authors: George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing, Sotiris Nikoletseas, Christoforos Raptopoulos, and Paul Spirakis

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 57, 24th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2016)

Abstract
In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. We focus on acknowledgment-based protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In this case she will learn whether her transmission was successful or not. Users that do not transmit will not receive any feedback. We are interested in equilibrium protocols, where no player has an incentive to deviate. The limited feedback makes the design of equilibrium protocols a hard task as best response policies usually have to be modeled as Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes, which are hard to analyze. Nevertheless, we show how to circumvent this for the case of two players and present an equilibrium protocol. For many players, we give impossibility results for a large class of acknowledgment-based protocols, namely age-based and backoff protocols with finite expected finishing time. Finally, we provide an age-based equilibrium protocol, which has infinite expected finishing time, but every player finishes in linear time with high probability.
Cite as

George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing, Sotiris Nikoletseas, Christoforos Raptopoulos, and Paul Spirakis. Strategic Contention Resolution with Limited Feedback. In 24th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 57, pp. 30:1-30:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{christodoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2016.30,
  author =	{Christodoulou, George and Gairing, Martin and Nikoletseas, Sotiris and Raptopoulos, Christoforos and Spirakis, Paul},
  title =	{{Strategic Contention Resolution with Limited Feedback}},
  booktitle =	{24th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2016)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-015-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{57},
  editor =	{Sankowski, Piotr and Zaroliagis, Christos},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2016.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-63813},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2016.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: contention resolution, acknowledgment-based protocols, game theory}
}
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